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The impact of crime on the local quality of life of a region is examined.  Using the 
methods suggested by Roback (1982) hedonic pricing analysis is used to examine the effects of 
eight categories of crime on property values and wages.  The hedonic results are then used to 
calculate the implicit prices of the various types of crime.  Prices are computed for both urban and 
rural areas reflecting differences in lifestyle and the corresponding impact of crime.  As expected, 
crime has a measurable negative cost and lowers overall quality of life in a region and the level of 
impact varies significantly by type of crime. 
  The unit of analysis for this study is U.S. counties, and the variables used are county-
wide percentages and averages.  The study includes 2,990 counties (847 urban and 2,143 rural) 
for which data was available.  Data from four sources were used in the model.  Earnings, rental 
values, crime, unemployment, housing statistics, and other demographic variables come from the 
1994 City and County Data Book (CCDB). Population, geography, and climate come from the 
U.S. Forest Service’s 1997 National Outdoor Recreation Supply Information System (NORSIS) 
data set.  Some housing statistics were collected from the 1990 Census of Housing and 
Population.  Crime statistics are those reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1990 
Uniform Crime Reporting and Program Data (FBI). 
  Results using the national database suggest that murder has the highest “disamenity” 
value with an implicit price of -$4,400 for metropolitan counties and -$3,200 for non-metropolitan 
counties.  Rape has the second highest “disamenity” value at -$3,500 for metro counties but 
practically a zero value in non-metropolitan counties.  This latter result for non-metro counties 
may be due to lower occurrence of rape being reported in rural areas or the lower likelihood of 
rapes receiving media attention.  But, in nearly every other category of crime, the implicit price of 
crime is higher in non-metro counties than metro.  The generally higher disamenity values of 
crime in rural areas may suggest that rural residents are more sensitive to crime overall than 
urban residents. Most other categories of crime have disamenity values ranging from few 
hundred dollars to actual positive values.  Some types of crime, such as burglary, are attract to 
high quality of life areas. 
  For Wisconsin counties, Ozaukee, St. Croix and Pierce have the highest crime driven 
quality of life rankings for metro counties while La Crosse and Milwaukee counties have the 
lowest quality of life ranking.  For non-metro Wisconsin counties Burnett, Adams and Waushara 
rank the highest for crime driven quality of life rankings and Dunn and Iron counties the lowest.  
From a national perspective Burnett county is ranked 10
th in the nation out of 2,143 non-metro 
counties while Milwaukee is rank 754
th in terms of all (847) metro counties used in the study. 
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Introduction 
The impact of a region’s quality of life on economic growth and development is well 
documented in the regional science literature (Graves 1979, 1980, 1983; Greenwood 1985; 
Beasley and Bowles 1991; Gottlieb 1994 Dissart and Deller 2000; and Deller, et al. 2001).  It has 
been shown that many people and firms are willing to make sacrifices to live in high amenity 
areas.  People are willing to accept lower wages and pay higher property prices in order to live in 
locations that offer a higher quality of life.  Firms will accept paying higher wages and property 
prices in order to locate in areas where the firms’ owners and employees can enjoy improved 
quality of life.  Thus, equilibrium wages and property values can be expected to vary from region 
to region based on, among other things, the levels of various amenities (Roback 1982; Rosen 
1979; Henderson 1982; Bloomquist, et al 1988; Deller and Tsia 1998) 
It is not well known exactly what values people and firms place on various amenities 
when making location decisions.  Most amenities, such as scenic lakes and forests, are public 
goods and cannot be or are not traded in any type of market; so formal prices do not exist 
(Hanley, et al 1997; Freeman 1993; Baumol and Oates 1988).  But this does not mean that the 
amenities have no value.  Over the past thirty-five years a wide body of literature has developed 
that offers various methods for measuring the value of amenities in the absence of a market 
price.  One of the most common methods is hedonic pricing analysis.  This technique, which 
traces its roots to the work of Griliches (1958, 1961) and Court (1939),
1 uses statistical analysis to 
explain the variation in the price of a good using the good’s characteristics as the explanatory 
variables. The statistically estimated coefficients from the models are then used to compute the 
implicit marginal prices of the characteristics.  To estimate prices for the amenities, the amenities 
are used as explanatory variables in predicting property prices (hedonic property models), wages 
(hedonic wage models), or both.
2   
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect of a single amenity, the crime 
rate, on the quality of life in Wisconsin counties.  In particular, this applied analysis uses and 
expands upon a methodology put forth by Roback (1982) to examine the effects of different types 
of crime on the quality of life, using a model that captures the effects of crime in two hedonic 
models – one for property values and one for wages.  A total of three specifications will be 
developed each of the wage and property models.  The first includes a simple composite 
measure of all index crimes for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation collects and reports 
data including murders, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, larcenies, motor 
                                                 
1 Goodman (1998) provides an interesting discussion of the history of Court’s early use of 
methods similar to today’s well-known hedonic methods. 
2 See Rosen (1974), Bartik (1988), Freeman (1993, 1995), and Hanley et al (1997) for detailed 
discussions of hedonic theory and methods. 
  3  vehicle thefts, and arsons.  The second model separates crime into two categories: violent crimes 
and property crimes.  The final model includes all eight index crimes as separate explanatory 
variables.  Implicit prices are calculated for the various crime categories in each model, and 
separate prices are calculated for urban and rural counties.  Finally, for purposes of comparison, 
the computed prices are used to calculate a crime-quality of life index for each county in 
Wisconsin relative to the nationally estimated model. 
The results of this study are useful in at least two ways.  First, the empirical model 
demonstrates the complexity involved in the relationship between crime, property values, and 
wages.  At first glance, because a low rate of crime can be viewed as an amenity, it seems logical 
that higher rates of crime should be negatively correlated with property values and positively 
correlated with wages.  But this may not be the case for all types of crime.  Some crimes, 
especially those involving theft, may be attracted to areas with higher property values and wages.  
In fact, a measure of wealth is often included as an explanatory variable in models that attempt to 
predict crime rates, especially for property crimes (Hakim 1980; Buck et al. 1990).  If this 
attraction effect is stronger than the disamenity effect, the empirical results may not have the 
expected sign or may be insignificant.   
Likewise, the reporting of crimes may also be correlated with wages and property values.  
People in wealthier neighborhoods may be more likely to have insurance policies, which require a 
police report when a claim is filed.  This may increase the reporting of property crimes in wealthier 
areas.  Reporting rates for violent crimes may also be higher in these areas.  These effects may 
be strong enough to influence the empirical results.  Finally, crime rates for one crime category 
can be expected to be correlated with those of other crime categories.  This may create 
collinearity problems with the wage and hedonic models.  More importantly, this may introduce 
omitted variable bias into models that exclude certain types of crimes. 
A second area of importance for this study is that it investigates an area that has not 
received a great deal of attention in the past twenty years.  The body of literature on hedonic 
modeling is large, but very few articles have focused on how crime affects the quality of life.  
Developing a greater understanding of the costs of crime, especially the difference in the costs of 
various crimes, may provide policy makers with better information for making decisions on how to 
best use limited resources.  The results of this study provide an updated estimate on a national 
scale with a particular focus on Wisconsin.  In addition, separate prices have been computed for 
urban and rural counties.  Nearly all of the studies in the current literature have used data for 
urban areas while rural areas have received little attention.  As shown below, the effects of crime 
on the quality of life in rural areas are largely similar to that in urban areas but there are some 
significant differences.  The difference in lifestyles, hence the role of crime, is different across 
rural and urban America as well as Wisconsin. 
   
  4  Review of The Literature 
Surprisingly, in the literature on property values and hedonic modeling only a handful of 
articles explore the relationship between crime and property value. A large number of articles in 
which hedonic models are estimated do not consider crime (Bailey 1966, Brigham 1965, Cropper 
et al 1988, Edmonds 1985, Goodman 1977, Witte et al 1979).  These studies instead include 
other variables, like racial composition or quality of schools, which attempt to measure 
neighborhood quality.  Knapp (1998) provides an excellent review of the literature that examines 
the determinants of property value.  In addition, most of the studies that do explore the effects of 
crime were conducted thirty to forty years ago and are now dated.  Several more recent studies 
focusing on other topics have included crime as an explanatory variable in a hedonic property 
model in a somewhat haphazard manner.  Only Hellman and Naroff (1979), Rizzo (1979) and 
Thaler (1978) focus their attention on the capitalization of crime into local property values.  Only 
two studies include the effects of violent crimes (Dubin and Sung 1990; Diamond 1980) and one 
looks at property crimes (Thaler 1978). Most of the available literature simply uses an aggregate 
measure that includes all crime.  None of the studies identified explores the separate effects of 
different types of crime.  
The literature on the effects of wages on crime is even sparser than the literature on 
property values.  Most hedonic wage studies include only characteristics of people and jobs as 
explanatory variables and do not attempt to control for neighborhood or regional characteristics.  
Only a handful of studies include crime as an explanatory variable in a hedonic wage model.  
Roback (1982) reports a positive relationship between wages and crime, suggesting that people 
need to be compensated for working in a high crime area with higher wages.  Deller et al. (2001) 
finds a negative, though not highly significant, relationship between income growth and crime.  
Many studies use hedonic wage models to estimate the value placed on the risk of injury in 
various jobs (e.g., Herzog and Schlottman 1990), and several studies have examined the 
relationship between environmental amenities and wages (Roback 1982; Rosen 1979; 
Henderson 1982; Smith and Gilbert 1985; Bloomquist, et al 1988).  These studies have shown 
that, with other factors held constant, wages tend to be lower in areas that are rich in 
environmental amenities.  Since a low crime rate can be considered to be an amenity (or 
conversely, high crime rates serve as a “disamenity”), it is reasonable to expect that, on average, 
low crime areas will have lower wage rates, other factors held constant. 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Model 
The implicit prices of crime presented below are calculated using methods developed by 
Roback (1982).  Roback expands the work of Rosen (1979) by developing a valuation technique 
using the hedonic modeling approach to examine the value of amenities through their effects on 
land and labor markets.  In short, the Roback expanded model integrates property and wage 
  5  hedonic models to fully capture the capitalization (i.e., price) effects of amenities, including 
disamenities such as crime.  The result is a simple general equilibrium model to compute the 
implicit price of an amenity. 
The basic premise of the Roback model can be described in wage-land value space as 
depicted in Figure 1.  The figure shows a set of indifference curves for consumers and isocost 
curves for firms.  The consumer’s curve is the set of all the combinations of wages and land 
values that will keep the consumer at a constant level of utility, for a given level of crime (CR).  In 
this case CR can be any category of crime.  Likewise, the firm’s isocost curve is the set of all 
combinations of wages and land values at which a firm can produce at a constant cost, given CR.  
There will be an equilibrium at the point where the consumer’s indifference curve intersects the 
firm’s isocost curve.  In Figure 1, the system starts at an equilibrium point A where the crime rate 
is CR.  If crime then decreases to CR’ the equilibrium point moves to B.  Here both wages and 
land values increase, but this may not always be the case.  The position of B relative to A 
depends on the shapes of the curves.  Since crime harms both consumers and firms, the value of 
land should always increase with a decrease in crime.  This occurs because both consumers and 
firms are willing to pay higher land prices to avoid crime.  The change in wage depends on the 
shape of the curves.  Consumers will accept lower wages to avoid crime, but firms will pay higher 
wages to avoid crime.  The net change in wages depends on which effect is stronger, and the 
effect may vary across different types of crimes. 
 










More formally, Roback develops a simple general equilibrium model to compute the implicit price 
of an amenity, s (which can be measured continuously).  The model is a static, or short-run 
model.  All quantities are assumed to be constant, and cannot be altered by the actions of 
consumers or firms.  For simplicity, capital and labor are assumed to be completely mobile 
  6  between cities (i.e. there are no relocation costs for firms or workers).  Commuting to work within 
a region (e.g., city) is assumed to be costless, but commuting to work in another region is 
assumed to be prohibitively expensive.  The quantity of land is, of course, fixed within regions.  
However, land is assumed to be perfectly mobile between uses within a city.  Given these 
assumptions and an equilibrium distribution of labor and capital across cities, it is possible to 
characterize wages and rents as a function of s.  The key to the analysis is to empirically isolate 
the affects of the amenity, in this case crime, on property values and wages, then recombine 
those effects into a single scalar price.  Given observed levels of each explanatory variable, in 
particular the amenity variables, and the estimated prices, a relative ranking of quality of life can 
be computed for each observation (i.e., county).  A formal derivation of this approach is provided 
in a technical appendix. 
 
Data 
The unit of analysis for this study is U.S. counties, and the variables used are county-
wide percentages and averages.  The study includes 2,990 counties (847 urban and 2,143 rural) 
for which data was available.  Data from four sources were used in the model.  Earnings, rental 
values, crime, unemployment, housing statistics, and other demographic variables come from the 
1994 City and County Data Book (CCDB). Population, geography, and climate come from the 
U.S. Forest Service’s 1997 National Outdoor Recreation Supply Information System (NORSIS)
3 
data set.  Some housing statistics were collected from the 1990 Census of Housing and 
Population.  And crime statistics are those reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1990 
Uniform Crime Reporting and Program Data (FBI). Table 1 provides a list of these variables, their 
sources, mean values, and standard deviations.  Finally, since data on the budget share of land 
for the average household are not readily available, the estimate (3.5%) used by Roback will be 
used in computing implicit prices below. The value used for   is 19.17%, which is the average 





Three separate specifications of the wage and property value equations are estimated 
using different aggregation measures of crime across each type.  Hence a total of six equations 
are estimated and discussed.  The variables used in specifying each equation are outlined in 
Table 1.  For both the wage and property value equation, a set of variables to capture 
disequilibrium effects including the unemployment rate, income growth rates between 1980 and 
1990 and income growth rates squared as well as wealth accumulation measures including 
                                                 
3 Developed by the USFS Wilderness Assessment Unit, Southern Research Station in Athens 
Georgia. 
4. Average 1993 annual household mortgage payment in US is $5,988 (1993 American Housing 
Survey) with median household income of $31,241.  The ratio of 19.17 percent is straightforward. 
  7  number of banks and other financial institutions per 1,000 persons.  In addition, two sets of 
dummy variables are used in each set of equations.  Specifically an urban and rural dummy (rural 
= 1) identifier is used to separate the effects of city and rural lifestyles and a set of regional 
dummies to capture geographical differences across the country (New England as reference 
base).  A range of interaction terms between the rural dummy and our crime measures are used 
to separate the effects of urban and rural lifestyles. 
For the property value equation several controls are included ranging from the median 
age of homes, the percentage of homes that are large, the percentage of homes that are mobile 
homes, the percentage of multifamily homes and the average number of persons per room.  
These measures have become widely accepted in the hedonic literature.  For the wage equation 
control variables include the poverty rate, percent of the population over 25 years of age with a 
minimum of a bachelor’s degree, the percent of the population over 65 years of age, and the 
percent of the jobs within the county in agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, 
health services and government.  These variables are intended to capture both supply (poverty, 
education, age) and demand (economic base) considerations in the labor market.  Again, the 
specification of the wage equation is consistent with the available literature. 
 
Results 
Three sets of models, as described above, are estimated for this analysis.  Each set 
includes a hedonic property model, with the log of median home value as the dependent variable, 
and a hedonic wage model, with the log of weekly per capita earnings as the dependent variable.  
The first set of models includes a single measure of crime, the total of all eight FBI index crimes.  
The second set of models splits crime into two categories: violent crimes and property crimes.  
The final set of models separates crime into eight separate categories, one for each type of 
crime: murders, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, 




The model specifications for the property models perform well.  In each case the adjusted 
R-squared value is greater than 0.80, which is quite high for a cross sectional analysis.  The 
individual regression coefficients for the non-crime variables have the expected signs and are 
highly significant (at the 95% level or above) in nearly every case.  Perhaps the only unexpected 
sign is the significant and positive coefficient for unemployment.  This may be attributable to the 
demand for housing of people who move into an area to seek work.  It could also be capturing the 
effect of some omitted variable.  Variance in the quality and types of housing is controlled for 
using the median age of homes (negative), the percentage of homes that are large (positive), the 
  8  percentage of homes that are mobile homes (negative), the percentage of multifamily homes 
(positive), and the average number of persons per room (positive).  
The interaction terms capture the differences in the effects of crime between urban and 
rural counties.  For many of these variables the coefficients are not highly significant.  But their 
inclusion significantly improves the explanatory power of the model.
5  Aggregate crimes (from 
Model 1), property crimes (from Model 2), murders, rapes, robberies, burglaries, and larcenies all 
have positive coefficients for the interaction terms.  This indicates that property values in rural 
areas are affected less negatively by these types of crimes than property values in urban areas.  
The other categories all have negative coefficients and thus have a greater negative effect on 
rural property values.  Note that in some cases the magnitude of the interaction coefficient is 
large enough to change the sign of the marginal effect of the particular type of crime for rural 
areas. 
The coefficients for the crime variables display some interesting results.  They highlight 
the need to use caution when choosing explanatory variables to use in model specification and 
the potential problems that can result from simply including whichever measure of crime happens 
to be readily available.  In the first model, the composite crime variable has a coefficient that is 
negative and significant, indicating an inverse relationship between property values and crime.  
This follows conventional wisdom and matches the results of most previous research efforts.  The 
results for Model 2 and Model 3, however, are somewhat surprising.  In Model 2 the coefficient for 
property crime is negative and significant, as expected.  Its magnitude is nearly twice that of the 
crime variable in the first model.  The coefficient for violent crime is significant and positive, which 
defies the conventional logic.  It is possible that this represents a collinearity effect between the 
two crime variables.  When the model is run using only the violent crime variable, its coefficient is 
insignificant.  When only the property crime variable is used, its coefficient remains negative and 
significant.  The positive sign on violent crime may also be a result of how the variable is defined.  
In Model 3, violent crime and property crime are split into their four component crime categories.
6  
The coefficients in this model offer some surprises.  The coefficients for rapes, burglaries, and 
larcenies are negative, while the coefficients for aggravated assault and motor vehicle theft are 
positive and statistically significant.  The measures for murders, robberies, and arsons all have 
insignificant coefficients.   
Several factors could be affecting the results in the second and third models.  First, there 
is undoubtedly correlation among the eight crime categories.  Second, there may be a dual 
relationship between some types of crime and property values.  High levels of crime make an 
                                                 
5 A restricted least squares model was estimated setting all interaction term coefficients equal to 
0.  The coefficient for i66 is significant at the 95% level, as shown by its t-value.  The resulting F-
values were 63.41 for Model 2 and 21.07 for Model 3.  All three are significant at the 95% level. 
6 To test the overall significance of the 8 crime variables a restricted least squares version of 
Model 3 was estimated setting the eight crime coefficients to 0.  The resulting F-value is 21.51, 
which is significant at the 95% level. 
  9  area less desirable to live in, but wealthier areas will provide better targets for certain types of 
crimes.  The stronger effect will determine the coefficient’s sign.  Third, there may be issues in 
how crimes are reported and how they are perceived.  Crimes in wealthier neighborhoods may be 
more likely to be reported, especially for property crimes, which require a police report in order for 
the victim to file an insurance claim.  In addition, the perception of risk may differ by the type of 
crime.  Crimes that do not often occur in or near the home, like robberies, may not have a great 
affect on property values because they are somewhat independent of the neighborhood or area 
that the home is located in.  For other crimes, like murders, the victims often know the 
perpetrators, so the crimes are more or less independent of location.  Thus, they may not 
significantly affect property values.  For example, when the murder rate is included as the only 
crime variable in the model its coefficient remains insignificant at the 95% level.  A similar result is 
found for robberies and arsons.  Finally, this model looks at crime at the county level using 
aggregate and average measures.  While this provides insights on crime in the nation as a whole, 
variation within counties, which can be significant, is not accounted for in the model.  
 
Wages 
The three wage models also perform well.  In each case the adjusted R-square value is 
at least 0.42, not as large as those for the property models but still quite high for a cross-sectional 
analysis.  The education (positive coefficient) and age (negative) variables control for the 
characteristics of the work force.  The industry employment variables (negative) control for 
differences in industry concentrations within the county.  The coefficient for the rural dummy is 
positive but not significant at the 95% level. 
The interaction terms capture the differences in the effects of crime between urban and 
rural counties.  As in the property models, many of the coefficients are not highly significant, but 
they have been included because they significantly improve the explanatory power of the model.
7  
Aggregate crimes (from Model 1), property crimes (from Model 2), rapes, aggravated assaults, 
larcenies, and arsons all have negative coefficients on the interaction terms.  This indicates that 
wages in rural areas are affected more negatively by these types of crimes than wages in urban 
areas.  The other categories all have positive coefficients and thus have a lesser negative effect 
on rural property values.  Note that in some cases the magnitude of the interaction coefficient is 
large enough to change the sign of the marginal effect of the particular type of crime for rural 
areas. 
                                                 
7 In Model 1, the coefficient for i66 is significant at the 95% level, as shown by it’s t-value.  For the 
other models a restricted least squares model was estimated, setting all interaction term 
coefficients equal to 0. The resulting F-values were 13.38 for Model2, 4.46 for Model 3.  Both are 
significant at the 95% level. 
  10  The coefficients on the crime variables provide fewer surprises than those in the property 
models.
8  In the first model the coefficient on aggregate crime is positive and significant, 
suggesting that wages must be higher to compensate people for living in high crime areas.  
Similarly, the coefficients for the violent crime and property crime variables in the second model 
are positive and their values are roughly equal to the coefficient on crime in the first model.  In the 
third model, many of the crime coefficients (murders, aggravated assaults, robberies, and arsons) 
are positive but insignificant.  The coefficients for rapes, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts are 
positive and statistically significant, as expected.  Burglaries, on the other hand, have a 
significantly negative coefficient.  This is most likely because wealthier areas provide more 
attractive targets for burglars. 
 
Estimated Prices 
Implicit prices of the various categories of crime for the average U.S. county, rural and 
urban, are reported in Table 4.  Prices are calculated using the methods detailed above and the 
results of the hedonic (property and wage) models.  With a few notable exceptions, the prices 
make intuitive sense.  Nearly all the prices are found to be negative, which indicates that most 
crimes can be considered to be disamenities.  Overall, the price of aggregate crime is -$162.92 
for urban areas, but only -$67.25 for rural, likely a reflection of the higher rates of crime in urban 
areas.  Both prices are significant at the 95% level.  The negative price is indicative of crime 
being a disamenity. Clearly, murder has the highest impact at -$4,420.62 for urban areas and -
$3,151.09 for rural.  Yet, its price is not significant in either urban or rural counties.  Perhaps this 
result is because most murderers know the victim and, thus, the likelihood of being a murdered is 
not highly correlated with living or work location.   
The rape variable shows a distinct and interesting difference between urban areas, where 
it’s price (-$3,510.96) is negative and significant at the 95% level, and rural areas where the price 
is highly insignificant.  This likely has to do with the patterns of the crime in urban areas (where 
the perpetrator is more likely to be a stranger) compared to rural areas.  On the other hand, the 
pattern is reversed for robberies which have a negative and significant price in rural areas but an 
insignificant in urban areas, and motor vehicle.  Burglaries in both urban and rural counties have 
positive and significant implicit prices.  This most likely occurs because wealthier areas provide 
more attractive targets for theft.  Arsons also have a positive price in both rural and urban areas, 
but neither is significant.  The prices for larcenies and motor vehicle thefts are negative in both 
urban and rural areas.  Their prices are significant at the 95% level, except for urban vehicle 
thefts, which is positive at the 85% level. 
                                                 
8 A restricted least squares version of Model 3 was run setting the eight crime coefficients to 0.  
The resulting F-value is 30.02, which is significant at the 95% level.  
  11  The magnitudes of the prices are also interesting.  For some categories of crime the 
implicit price is higher in urban counties than in rural counties.  There is not a clear pattern for this 
relationship.  But, in both urban and rural counties, a clear pattern in the prices of different types 
of crimes is evident.  The prices of violent crimes tend to be more negative than the prices of 
property crimes.  And more serious crimes within a category (murders, rapes, and motor vehicle 
thefts) have prices that are more negative than less serious crimes (aggravated assaults and 
larcenies). 
 
Wisconsin County Rankings 
  Given the estimated wage and property value equations and the corresponded estimated 
prices for different types of crime, it is possible to compute quality of life indices for each 
individual observations (county) contained in the database.  The results of these computations for 
the subset of Wisconsin counties contained in the database are reported in Tables 5 and 6.  It is 
important to note that the model has been constructed to reflect differences in rural and urban 
attitudes toward crime and the crime dependent quality of life measures and corresponding 
rankings are specific to metro and nonmetro counties.   
  For Wisconsin metro counties Ozaukee reported lowest overall crime rates with only a 
$78 premium being paid for violent crimes but $3,153 for property crimes (Table 5).  The total 
price for the disamenity of crime in Ozaukee county is $3,230 which ranks Ozaukee as the best 
metro county for crime driven quality of life in Wisconsin and 113
th in the nation, out of 847 metro 
counties in the national database.  Other high ranking metropolitan counties in Wisconsin include 
St. Croix, Pierce, Waukesha and Calumet.  It is relevant to note that many of these high ranking, 
at least within Wisconsin, counties could be considered “suburban” counties adjacent to more 
traditional urban centers. 
  Metropolitan counties that ranked lower, include Milwaukee, La Crosse, Douglas, Rock 
and Dane.  For Milwaukee County, the premium paid for violent crimes is $3,694 and $11,776 for 
property crime for a total price of crime of -$15,470 per household.  Of the  847 metro counties in 
the national database, Milwaukee County ranked near the bottom in the 754
th position.  The 
metro areas with the highest crime disamenity affect include Atlanta, St. Louis, New Orleans, 
Atlantic City, Miami, Dallas and Washington DC.  The type of crime that appears to have the 
biggest impact on “poor” performing Wisconsin metro counties is larceny.  
  For rural Wisconsin rural counties, Burnett in particular report very low prices of crime 
and ranks 10
th in the nation out of 2,143 nonmetro counties (Table 6).  Although Burnett has a 
higher than average incident of burglary, likely due to the high number of seasonal recreational 
homes, the lower than average rates of other crimes drives the overall crime driven quality of life 
ranking high.  Care must be taken, however, because of the positive price associated with 
burglaries (recall the results suggest that high quality of life areas tend to attract certain types of 
  12  crime, in particular burglary) the result for Burnett and a handful of other rural Wisconsin counties 
may suggest that crime is a non-issue for these areas.  This is clearly not that case.  Other 
counties with relatively high crime related quality of life rankings include Adams, Wuashara, 
Marquette and Rusk. 
  Rural Wisconsin counties that have lower crime related quality of life rankings include 
Sauk, Manitowoc, Shawano, Fond du Lac, Dunn and Iron.  For Iron County, the lowest ranked 
Wisconsin rural county, the price of violent crime is only -$416 and -$3,672 for property crimes.  
The total price of crime is slightly more than -$4,000 per household.  This is only slightly higher 
than the best ranked urban county (Ozaukee at -$3,230) and much lower than most other urban 
counties in Wisconsin.  For Iron County, larceny, motor vehicle theft and assault appear to be 
driving the lower crime related quality of life rankings.  
 
Conclusions 
The results of this analysis have shown that crime rates have a significant impact on 
property values and wages, and that by examining these relationships it is possible to make 
inferences about the relative impacts of crime on the quality of life.  The results also demonstrate 
that there are similarities and differences between the effects of crime in rural areas and crime in 
urban areas.  In addition, the results from the hedonic analyses show that the effects of crime on 
property values and wages may not be as straightforward as they might seem.  There are 
complicated relationships at work; as a result, modeling efforts should carefully consider the types 
of crime categories included in the analysis.   
As one would expect violent crimes, such as murder and rape, have a much higher price 
attached to them.  But non-violent crimes, such as motor vehicle theft and larceny, can have a 
much broader impact because of the higher rate of frequency for these types of crime.  Result for 
Wisconsin, and the nation as a whole, suggest that the cost of crime, as measured through the 
implicit prices estimated and reported here, is significantly lower in rural than urban counties.  
This is due not only to differences in the rates of crime, but also in the values attached to crime by 
rural and urban residents.   
The results provide here should help local policy decision makers craft more informed 
decisions on how to allocate scarce resources in improving overall quality of life.  For some 
areas, such as Milwaukee County small reduction in crime can have a significant impact on 
quality of life.  In other areas, such as Burnett County, a similar change in crime rates may have 
much smaller affects on quality of life.  Clearly crime is but one factor that affects overall quality of 
life, but for many places, it is one factor that can be influenced by local policies. 
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TABLE 1 
Variables Used in Hedonic Property and Wage Models 
 






MORTPYMT  1990 annual mortgage payment for median-valued 
home, assuming 10% down payment and 10.04% 
interest rate (1990 dollars per year) 
CCDB 
4,202.22 1,938.02 7,524.30 4,272.66
LOG_MORT log  (MORTPYMT)  CCDB  8.28  0.35  8.82 0.42
EARN  1990 annual per capita earnings  (1990 dollars)  CCDB  23,872.47  11,864.35  30,238.44 14,478.16
LOG_EARN log  (EARN)  CCDB  10.01  0.37  10.22 0.43
VARIABLES TO CAPTURE DISEQUILIBRIUM & WEALTH EFFECTS 
UNEMPLOY  1991 Civilian unemployment rate (%)  CCDB  7.38  3.52  6.60 2.21
INC_GROW  Change in Median Household Income 1980-90 (%)  CCDB  64.46  18.29  75.22 20.70
INC_GSQR  INC_GROW squared (% squared)  CCDB  4,490.01  2,510.14  6,086.53 3,204.29
BANK  1990 Number of banks and savings institutions (number 
per 1,000 population) 
CCDB 
0.51 0.28 0.33 0.11
HOUSING MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
HM_AGE  1990 Median age of homes (years)  1990 Census 27.04  9.73  23.32 8.73
LRG_HM  1990 Homes with 3+ bedrooms (%)  1990 Census 57.09  7.12  58.39 8.79
MOBLHM  1990 Homes classified as mobile home or trailer (%)  CCDB  15.76  8.05  9.93 7.95
MULTIFAM  1990 Homes in buildings with 5+ units (%)  CCDB  4.00  3.79  11.62 8.98
PPRM  1990 Average persons per room in household (number 
of persons) 
NORSIS/ 
1990 Census 0.41  0.07  0.45 0.05
LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
EDUBACH  1990 population over 25 with bachelor's degree or higher 
(%) 
CCDB 
11.74 4.84  18.01 7.94
OLD  1990 population age 65+ (%)  CCDB  15.98  4.12  12.08 3.53
E_AG  1990 Civilian labor force employed in agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries (%) 
CCDB 
10.84 9.38 2.94 2.51
E_MAN  1990 Civilian labor force employed in manufacturing (%) CCDB  18.42  11.34  18.96 8.03
E_TRADE  1990 Civilian labor force employed in wholesale and 
retail trade (%) 
CCDB 
18.94 3.56  21.40 2.55
E_HEALTH  1990 Civilian labor force employed in health services (%) CCDB  7.44  2.66  8.22 2.13
E_GOV  1990 Civilian labor force employed in public 
administration (%) 
CCDB 
4.75 2.86 4.95 3.16
CRIME VARIABLES 
CRIME  FBI Index Crimes reported (number per 1,000 
population) 
FBI 
27.06 18.41 47.59 24.63
VCRIME  FBI Index Crimes reported  - violent (number per 1,000 
population) 
FBI 
2.47 2.55 4.94 4.55
PCRIME  FBI Index Crimes reported - property (number per 1,000 
population) 
FBI 
24.59 16.92 42.65 21.10
C_MURDER  Murders reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  0.05  0.09  0.06 0.08
C_RAPE  Rapes reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  0.19  0.25  0.34 0.25
C_ROB  Robberies reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  0.22  0.37  1.22 1.93
C_ASSLT  Aggravated assaults reported (number per 1,000 
population) 
FBI 
2.01 2.23 3.32 2.88
C_BURG  Burglaries reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  7.00  5.02  10.60 5.76
C_LARCEN  Larcenies reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  16.12  12.69  28.16 13.77
C_MVT  Motor vehicle thefts reported (number per 1,000 
population) 
FBI 
1.27 1.02 3.59 3.87
C_ARSON  Arsons reported (number per 1,000 population)  FBI  0.19  0.28  0.30 0.28
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Variables Used in Hedonic Property and Wage Models 
 





Crime Interaction Variables 
I66 RURAL*CRIME  Calculated  27.06  18.41 
I67 RURAL*VCRIME  Calculated  2.47  2.55 
I68 RURAL*PCRIME  Calculated  24.59  16.92 
I69 RURAL*C_MURDER  Calculated  0.05  0.09 
I70 RURAL*C_RAPE  Calculated  0.19  0.25 
I71 RURAL*C_ROB  Calculated  0.22  0.37 
I72 RURAL*C_ASSLT  Calculated  2.01  2.23 
I73 RURAL*C_BURG  Calculated  7.00  5.02 
I74 RURAL*C_LARCEN  Calculated  16.12  12.69 
I75 RURAL*C_MVT  Calculated  1.27  1.02 
I76 RURAL*C_ARSON  Calculated  0.19  0.28 
Dummy Variables 
Percent = 1  Variable Definition  (units)  Source 
Rural Urban 




R_ENC  County in Census Bureau East North Central Region**  1990 Census 87.30  81.63 
R_ESC  County in Census Bureau East South Central Region**  1990 Census 12.70  18.37 
R_MA  County in Census Middle Atlantic Region**  1990 Census 87.26  90.63 
R_MTN  County in Census Bureau Mountain Region**  1990 Census 12.74  9.37 
R_PAC  County in Census Bureau Pacific Region**  1990 Census 97.43  88.66 
R_SA  County in Census Bureau South Atlantic Region**  1990 Census 2.57  11.34 
R_WNC  County in Census Bureau West North Central Region**  1990 Census 89.12  95.81 
R_WSC  County in Census Bureau West South Central Region**  1990 Census 10.88  4.19 
* Defined using U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (ERS) 1993 Rural/Urban Continuum 
Code 
** Base region is New England 
 
  15   
TABLE 2 
Results of Hedonic Property Models 
 
  MODEL1  MODEL2  MODEL3 
Degrees of Freedom  2,870  2,870  2,870 
Adjusted R-squared  0.8124  0.8150  0.8220 
Variable Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient T-stat 
INTERCEP 9.4323  132.9780 9.5012  132.1310 9.5902 133.5380 
POP_INC 0.0035  11.0310  0.0037  11.4790  0.0038 12.0500 
UNEMPLOY -0.0091  -6.6490  -0.0096  -7.0760  -0.0091 -6.7090 
INC_GROW -0.0060  -6.6300  -0.0058  -6.4260  -0.0050 -5.6740 
INC_GSQR 0.0001  10.5310  0.0001  10.1180  0.0001 9.2050 
BANK -0.0717  -3.6420  -0.0724  -3.7000  -0.0711 -3.6960 
HM_AGE -0.0145  -21.1810  -0.0151  -21.9350 -0.0152 -22.4000 
LRG_HM 0.0058  9.0810  0.0060  9.4850  0.0055 8.6750 
MOBLHM -0.0083  -11.9490  -0.0087  -12.4790 -0.0085 -12.3000 
MULTIFAM 0.0203  22.2380  0.0201  22.0410  0.0163 16.5350 
PPRM -0.3243  -4.8900  -0.3486  -5.2250  -0.4426 -6.5320 
R_ENC -0.4545  -16.1260  -0.4670  -16.6270 -0.4645 -16.6350 
R_ESC -0.6170  -20.8390  -0.6377  -21.4280 -0.6166 -20.8080 
R_MA -0.1723  -5.8620  -0.1872  -6.3830  -0.1913 -6.5190 
R_MTN -0.3849  -12.9610  -0.3966  -13.4010 -0.3982 -13.5740 
R_PAC -0.0968  -3.1040  -0.1057  -3.4070  -0.1005 -3.2790 
R_SA -0.4987  -17.9290  -0.5152  -18.4260 -0.4881 -17.3650 
R_WNC -0.6350  -22.2860  -0.6466  -22.7840 -0.6392 -22.7610 
R_WSC -0.6511  -22.1140  -0.6662  -22.6100 -0.6415 -21.8130 
RURAL -0.2336  -12.5710  -0.2641  -13.8490 -0.3027 -14.9590 
I66 0.0036  9.3310  ---  ---  --- --- 
CRIME -0.0019  -5.7490  ---  ---  --- --- 
I67 ---  ---  -0.0108  -3.6190  --- --- 
I68 ---  ---  0.0060  10.6350  --- --- 
VCRIME ---  ---  0.0125  5.4580  --- --- 
PCRIME ---  ---  -0.0044  -8.5980  --- --- 
I69 ---  ---  ---  ---  0.1904 1.4420 
I70 ---  ---  ---  ---  0.1087 2.6900 
I71 ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0204 -1.1760 
I72 ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0057 -1.3610 
I73 ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0108 4.2440 
I74 ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0046 5.1800 
I75 ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0044 -0.6390 
I76 ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0246 -0.7710 
C_MURDER ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.2482 -1.9860 
C_RAPE ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.1249 -3.4440 
C_ROB ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0256 2.9500 
C_ASSLT ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0095 2.7510 
C_BURG ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0157 -6.8480 
C_LARCEN ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.0010 -1.1570 
C_MVT ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0141 3.7700 
C_ARSON ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0138 0.4890 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Hedonic Wage Models 
 
 MODEL1  MODEL2  MODEL3 
Degrees of Freedom  2,870  2,870  2,870 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4285  0.4287  0.4464 
Variable Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient T-stat 
INTERCEP 10.1538  96.5660  10.1574  96.5540  10.2081 97.5920 
POP_INC -0.0048  -10.2890  -0.0047  -10.1160  -0.0042 -8.8950 
UNEMPLOY -0.0219  -9.8000  -0.0221  -9.8810  -0.0206 -9.2850 
INC_GROW -0.0066  -4.3010  -0.0067  -4.3180  -0.0062 -4.0680 
INC_GSQR 0.0000  4.5540  0.0000  4.5250  0.0000 4.2810 
BANK 0.2183  7.0000  0.2207  7.0700  0.2188 7.0970 
EDUBACH 0.0187  14.1310  0.0190  14.1720  0.0170 12.5080 
OLD -0.0290  -15.4460  -0.0290  -15.4520  -0.0255 -13.5010 
E_AG 0.0100  7.7590  0.0100  7.7410  0.0096 7.4970 
E_MAN 0.0043  4.2500  0.0043  4.2800  0.0035 3.4720 
E_TRADE 0.0024  1.0770  0.0027  1.2050  0.0005 0.2060 
E_HEALTH 0.0048  1.7560  0.0048  1.7280  0.0029 1.0600 
E_GOV -0.0035  -1.4740  -0.0036  -1.5450  -0.0039 -1.6690 
R_ENC -0.0300  -0.6740  -0.0330  -0.7400  -0.0362 -0.8150 
R_ESC -0.1438  -3.1680  -0.1531  -3.3460  -0.1549 -3.3950 
R_MA 0.0545  1.1830  0.0496  1.0740  0.0540 1.1670 
R_MTN -0.0928  -1.9430  -0.0972  -2.0310  -0.1090 -2.2920 
R_PAC 0.0462  0.9330  0.0423  0.8530  0.0270 0.5500 
R_SA -0.0866  -2.0200  -0.0961  -2.2230  -0.0930 -2.1430 
R_WNC -0.0949  -2.0870  -0.0978  -2.1500  -0.1042 -2.3070 
R_WSC -0.0913  -1.9840  -0.0987  -2.1350  -0.0810 -1.7590 
RURAL 0.1160  3.9330  0.1137  3.7300  0.0932 2.8590 
I66 -0.0033  -5.6930  --  --  -- -- 
CRIME 0.0065  14.3640  --  --  -- -- 
I2 --  --  0.0004  0.0940  -- -- 
I3 --  --  -0.0036  -4.0370  -- -- 
VCRIME --  --  0.0081  2.2770  -- -- 
PCRIME --  --  0.0061  7.8720  -- -- 
I4 --  --  --  --  -0.0167 -0.0800 
I5 --  --  --  --  -0.1263 -1.9670 
I6 --  --  --  --  0.0676 2.4970 
I7 --  --  --  --  0.0048 0.7240 
I8 --  --  --  --  -0.0041 -1.0070 
I9 --  --  --  --  -0.0041 -2.8950 
I10 --  --  --  --  0.0253 2.3120 
I11 --  --  --  --  -0.0441 -0.8710 
C_MURDER --  --  --  --  0.1376 0.6960 
C_RAPE --  --  --  --  0.1231 2.1380 
C_ROB --  --  --  --  0.0140 1.0590 
C_ASSLT --  --  --  --  0.0019 0.3560 
C_BURG --  --  --  --  -0.0089 -2.4630 
C_LARCEN --  --  --  --  0.0095 7.3100 
C_MVT --  --  --  --  0.0123 2.0790 
C_ARSON --  --  --  --  0.0021 0.0480 
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Table 4 







Mean T-stat* Mean T-stat* 
Model1 
CRIME Crimes/1,000  persons  -$67.25 -3.80  -$162.92  -15.00 
Model2 
VCRIME  Violent Crimes/1,000 persons  -$196.09 -1.38 -$135.90 -1.59 
PCRIME  Property Crimes/1,000 persons  -$54.07  -1.89 -$166.87 -8.88 
Model3 
C_MURDER Murders/1,000  persons  -$3,151.09 -0.46 -$4,420.62 -0.93 
C_RAPE Rapes/1,000  persons  $0.54 0.0003  -$3,510.96 -2.54 
C_ROB Robberies/1,000  persons  -$1,924.84 -2.65 -$218.18 -0.68 
C_ASSLT  Aggravated Assaults/1,000 persons  -$142.18 -0.69  -$2.75  -0.02 
C_BURG Burglaries/1,000  persons  $288.56 2.20 $141.60 1.62 
C_LARCEN Larcenies/1,000  persons  -$113.19 -2.43 -$232.13 -7.40 
C_MVT  Motor Vehicle Thefts/1,000 persons  -$852.07 -2.84 -$228.18 -1.61 
C_ARSON Arsons/1,000  persons  $951.66  0.58 $11.98 0.01 
 
Prices calculated using the regression coefficients reported in Tables 3 and 4 and the following values:
Average Annual Earnings per Worker - rural:     $23,872 
Average Annual Earnings per Worker - urban:    $30,238 
Average Budget Share of Mortgage:                     19.17% 
 
*Discrete t-statistic calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations. 
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     Table 5: Crime Indices, Prices and National Ranking for METRO WISCONSIN Counties      NATIONAL 




Crimes All  Crimes
COUNTY 
RANK 
Implicit Price  -$4,420.62  -$3,510.96 -$218.18  -$2.75  $141.60 -$232.13  -$228.18 $11.98  ---        --- --- All  Crimes
Average Crime Rate 
(Metro Counties)  0.02                     0.15 0.53 1.05 6.77 29.63 2.28 0.23 --- --- ---   
                            
Ozaukee, WI  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.71  2.61  14.73  0.45 0.11          -$78 -$3,153 -$3,230 113
St Croix, WI  0.02  0.18  0.12  0.86  4.34  15.56  1.73  0.10  -$745  -$3,392  -$4,137  175 
Pierce, WI  0.00  0.09  0.03  0.40  3.14  18.28  1.59            0.09 -$329 -$4,160 -$4,489 199
Waukesha, WI  0.00  0.09  0.19  0.85  4.67  19.30  1.47  0.16  -$344  -$4,153  -$4,497  200 
Calumet, WI  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.47  4.75  18.75  0.82  0.06  -$681  -$3,865  -$4,547  207 
Chippewa, WI  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.73  4.43  21.58  1.18  0.10  -$380  -$4,651  -$5,032  239 
Washington, WI  0.01  0.08  0.07  0.67  4.38  24.67  0.98  0.19  -$359  -$5,327  -$5,686  291 
Marathon, WI  0.00  0.12  0.09  0.96  5.25  25.54  1.34            0.16 -$447 -$5,489 -$5,936 304
Outagamie, WI  0.00  0.05  0.09  0.68  5.67  27.59  0.65  0.07  -$197  -$5,751  -$5,948  305 
Eau Claire, WI  0.01  0.08  0.09  0.76  8.50  32.46              1.55 0.38 -$363 -$6,680 -$7,043 392
Sheboygan, WI  0.00  0.08  0.13  1.37  6.12  32.11  1.00            0.40 -$304 -$6,809 -$7,113 396
Winnebago, WI  0.01  0.03  0.10  0.78  7.09  34.49  1.25  0.14  -$156  -$7,287  -$7,443  420 
Brown, WI  0.02  0.11  0.14  1.69  4.91  31.67  1.54            0.26 -$524 -$7,004 -$7,528 429
Kenosha, WI  0.04  0.35  0.86  0.84  10.22  33.65  2.69            0.44 -$1,595 -$6,972 -$8,567 504
Racine,  WI                          0.06 0.19 1.90 2.85 12.42 35.83 3.13 0.34 -$1,381 -$7,267 -$8,648 511
Dane,  WI                          0.01 0.22 0.82 1.94 8.98 38.27 2.72 0.32 -$1,010 -$8,230 -$9,240 547
Rock, WI  0.01  0.21  0.65  1.07  8.95  40.10  1.90            0.43 -$907 -$8,468 -$9,375 553
Douglas, WI  0.02  0.12  0.34  0.46  13.17  43.61  3.16  0.17  -$601  -$8,977  -$9,578  566 
La Crosse, WI  0.00  0.21  0.12  1.00  3.86  41.05  1.47            0.10 -$783 -$9,317 -$10,099 600
Milwaukee, WI  0.16  0.56  4.59  1.98  12.01  43.35  14.98  0.51  -$3,694  -$11,776  -$15,470  754 
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     Table 6: Crime Indices, Prices and National Ranking for NON-METRO WISCONSIN Counties    NATIONAL 




Crimes  All Crimes
COUNTY 
RANK 
Implicit Price  -$3,151.09  $0.54  -$1,924.84 -$142.18 $288.56 -$113.19 -$852.07 $951.66  ---      --- ---   
Average Crime Rate 
(Metro Counties)  0.02  0.10  0.04  0.83  6.32  17.71  1.19  0.12  ---          --- ---
                            
Burnett,  WI                      0.08 0.08 0.00 0.38  17.35 8.25 1.07  0.00 -$295 $3,160 $2,865 10
Adams, WI                             0.00 0.26 0.19 0.57 17.92 18.88 1.91 0.00 -$450 $1,404 $954 95
Waushara, WI  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.36  11.45  17.44  0.77  0.15  -$51  $819  $768  113 
Marquette, WI  0.09  0.18  0.09  2.82  10.74  13.01  0.64  0.27  -$863  $1,342  $480  171 
Rusk, WI  0.00  0.27  0.00  2.25  8.42  12.60  0.66  0.13  -$320  $565  $245  234 
Washburn, WI  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.52  9.73  13.43              1.38 0.00 -$217 $112 -$105 383
Trempealeau, WI  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.13  3.25  7.38              0.34 0.04 -$18 -$146 -$164 412
Polk,  WI  0.03                        0.14 0.00 0.12 6.93 8.22 1.73 0.32 -$107 -$100 -$207 433
Oconto, WI  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.13  3.71  9.33              0.23 0.00 -$250 -$184 -$435 570
Vernon, WI  0.00  0.27  0.08  0.23  1.99  8.04              0.16 0.16 -$183 -$320 -$504 613
Bayfield,  WI                          0.07 0.00 0.00 0.36 8.71 12.64 1.78 0.21 -$276 -$234 -$510 617
Buffalo,  WI                          0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 2.43 8.83 0.52 0.15 -$21 -$598 -$619 682
Kewaunee, WI  0.05  0.16  0.00  0.05  3.39  8.16              0.85 0.16 -$174 -$516 -$690 719
Clark, WI  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.09  3.57  10.90              0.73 0.13 -$13 -$703 -$716 733
Marinette,  WI                          0.02 0.07 0.00 0.42 10.16 22.05 1.28 0.07 -$137 -$586 -$723 735
Green, WI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.66  6.92  18.52              0.99 0.30 -$94 -$660 -$753 753
Sawyer, WI  0.00  0.14  0.07  1.13  10.79  17.77              1.90 0.00 -$296 -$520 -$816 787
Iowa,  WI                          0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 2.73 10.72 0.55 0.05 $0 -$844 -$844 809
Forest,  WI                          0.00 0.11 0.00 1.71 12.76 20.17 2.51 0.00 -$243 -$736 -$979 894
Juneau,  WI                          0.14 0.00 0.09 0.69 9.33 19.26 1.11 0.14 -$713 -$300 -$1,013 918
Taylor, WI  0.00  0.26  0.05  0.63  5.71  14.76  1.01            0.05 -$192 -$828 -$1,020 923
Lafayette,  WI                          0.00 0.06 0.12 0.25 1.93 7.59 0.56 0.00 -$275 -$780 -$1,054 945
Vilas, WI  0.11  0.28  0.11  1.30  12.48  21.52  2.37            0.51 -$758 -$371 -$1,129 986
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     Table 6 (cont): Crime Indices, Prices and National Ranking for NON-METRO WISCONSIN Counties    NATIONAL 




Crimes  All Crimes
COUNTY 
RANK 
Implicit Price  -$3,151.09  $0.54  -$1,924.84 -$142.18 $288.56 -$113.19 -$852.07 $951.66  ---      --- ---   
Average Crime Rate 
(Metro Counties)  0.02  0.10  0.04  0.83  6.32  17.71  1.19  0.12  ---          --- ---
                            
Barron, WI  0.00  0.15  0.17  2.06  6.31  13.91  1.35 0.22          -$624 -$695 -$1,319 1,093
Green Lake, WI  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.70  3.38  14.37  0.75  0.00  -$99  -$1,291  -$1,390  1,121 
Price, WI  0.06  0.13  0.00  0.71  4.55  19.74  0.77            0.45 -$302 -$1,150 -$1,452 1,147
Lincoln, WI  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.07  5.22  19.19  1.04            0.11 -$82 -$1,443 -$1,525 1,178
Pepin, WI  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.70  2.11  10.98  0.98            0.00 -$100 -$1,472 -$1,572 1,202
Richland, WI  0.00  0.17  0.00  2.45  3.08  15.87  0.51            0.11 -$349 -$1,236 -$1,584 1,209
Grant, WI  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.65  3.43  15.43  0.89  0.12  -$234  -$1,401  -$1,636  1,235 
Florence, WI  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.44  5.66  15.25  1.31            0.00 -$481 -$1,205 -$1,687 1,262
Waupaca, WI  0.02  0.09  0.04  1.32  5.66  20.43  0.98            0.02 -$340 -$1,490 -$1,830 1,317
Jackson, WI  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.66  7.84  23.51  1.63            0.24 -$284 -$1,557 -$1,841 1,321
Door, WI  0.08  0.12  0.00  0.08  4.94  19.58  1.09            0.12 -$256 -$1,607 -$1,864 1,331
Oneida, WI  0.03  0.03  0.03  1.26  10.20  24.72  2.08            0.09 -$340 -$1,541 -$1,880 1,337
Crawford, WI  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.19  4.33  23.15  0.82  0.19  -$27  -$1,887  -$1,914  1,351 
Langlade, WI  0.00  0.10  0.05  1.18  6.51  24.71  1.08  0.05  -$266  -$1,787  -$2,053  1,400 
Monroe, WI  0.11  0.30  0.03  0.82  3.36  16.92  1.04            0.25 -$513 -$1,597 -$2,110 1,426
Dodge, WI  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.37  4.00              18.91  1.16 0.05 -$210 -$1,928 -$2,138 1,437
Columbia, WI  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.86  5.72  21.29  1.66  0.11  -$208  -$2,071  -$2,279  1,482 
Portage, WI  0.02  0.23  0.02  1.35  6.60  28.69  0.98  0.18  -$275  -$2,007  -$2,282  1,484 
Walworth, WI  0.00  0.05  0.12  0.77  5.09  24.39  1.28            0.44 -$341 -$1,963 -$2,303 1,494
Wood, WI  0.00  0.07  0.07  1.89  5.33  23.14  1.32  0.14  -$399  -$2,076  -$2,475  1,550 
Jefferson, WI  0.00  0.06  0.10  0.47  4.09  24.19  1.12  0.24  -$266  -$2,290  -$2,556  1,585 
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     Table 6 (cont): Crime Indices, Prices and National Ranking for NON-METRO WISCONSIN Counties    NATIONAL 




Crimes  All Crimes
COUNTY 
RANK 
Implicit Price  -$3,151.09  $0.54  -$1,924.84 -$142.18 $288.56 -$113.19 -$852.07 $951.66  ---      --- ---   
Average Crime Rate 
(Metro Counties)  0.02  0.10  0.04  0.83  6.32  17.71  1.19  0.12  ---          --- ---
                            
Ashland, WI  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.31  5.27  22.93  1.59 0.00          -$237 -$2,433 -$2,670 1,626
Sauk, WI  0.00  0.04  0.09  0.45  3.17  25.20  0.72            0.02 -$227 -$2,534 -$2,762 1,655
Manitowoc, WI  0.01  0.09  0.07  0.57  4.07  25.33  1.16            0.14 -$264 -$2,549 -$2,813 1,670
Shawano, WI  0.03  0.16  0.00  0.46  5.19  25.06  1.64            0.00 -$150 -$2,736 -$2,886 1,684
Fond du Lac, WI  0.03  0.07  0.09  1.83  4.57  29.20              1.15 0.10 -$536 -$2,873 -$3,410 1,799
Dunn, WI  0.00  0.06  0.03  0.84  3.54  26.32  1.92            0.14 -$172 -$3,463 -$3,635 1,845
Iron, WI  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.93  6.66  21.29  3.74            0.00 -$416 -$3,672 -$4,088 1,915
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  27  Technical Appendix 
 
Following Roback define: 
 
s      quantity of amenity s 
x     amount of other goods consumed 
w   wage rate 
L    rental price of land 
I     nonlabor income 
u    utility at equilibrium 
c l    land used by consumers 
p l    land used in production 
N    total number of workers 
l k   share of land in consumer’s    
budget 
*




The consumer’s problem is the standard one, maximize utility, subject to an income 
constraint.   
     subject to      (1)  max ( , ; )
c VU x l  s
c wI xL l 
For simplicity, all workers are assumed to be homogenous and leisure is ignored (all workers 
supply exactly one unit of labor).  The solution to (1) is the indirect utility function.  Following the 
standard properties of utility, V  and V .  For an amenity, V , and for a disamenity, 
.  The equilibrium condition for workers is: 
0 w  0 r  0 s 
0 s V 
          ( 2 )   (,;) VwLs u 
Thus, to reach equilibrium, wages and rents adjust so that utility is equalized across all cities.  If 
not, an incentive to relocate would exist. 
 
Firms: 
Assume that firms produce a single good, X, using a constant-returns-to-scale production 
function,  .  At equilibrium, unit cost must equal the product price (which is 
normalized to unity in this case): 
(,; )
p Xf l N s 
          ( 3 )   (,;) 1 CwLs
So, in equilibrium, unit costs are equal.  Otherwise, firms would seek to relocate to cities where 
costs are lower.  The cost function is assumed to have the standard properties,   and 
.  In addition, with constant returns to scale, 
0 w C 




Cl .  Also note that 
for a productive amenity, C and for an unproductive amenity,  . 
X
0 s  C
 
Equilibrium: 
  28  We can use the Implicit Function Theorem and equations (2) and (3) to find 







( sr s r dw VC CV ds   

) 0       ( 4 a )  
       
1




) 0       ( 4 b )  
where  0 wL Lw i w VC VC L V X     , and  i L  is the total land available.  Assuming that s  is 
a productive amenity (i.e. VC), and using the properties of the cost function and the 
indirect utility function, we see that 
0; 0 ss 
0  dw
ds
 and that the sign of dL
ds
depends on the relative 
size of VCand  ws s w VC . 
 
Implicit Prices: 
Using the results above, the implicit price of an amenity can be found using Roy’s 
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w        (6) 
where 
*
s p  is the implicit price of crime (CR),   is the share of land in consumer’s budget,   is 
the wage rate, and 
l k w
L is the price of land. In equation (6), all of the terms are observable, either 
directly or using regression techniques. 










 can be estimated using a hedonic property model 
and a hedonic wage model, respectively.  The price formula calls for a semi-log functional form in 
each case.  The hedonic property model takes the following form: 
  12 3 4 log * ii i i i i L X R CR CR R e             (7) 
  29  where Li is the median value of owner occupied homes in region i, Xi is a vector of characteristics 
of homes within region i and of region i itself, Ri is a dummy variable equal to one if region i is 














       ( 8 )  
Similarly, the hedonic wage model takes the following form: 
  12 3 4 log * i iii i i wX R C C R R          e    (9) 
where wi is the average weekly per capita earnings in region i and Li, Xi, Ri, and Ci are defined as 












       ( 1 0 )  
Substituting equations (8) and (10) into the price equation (6), gives the final formula for 
calculating the implicit price of crime. 
      w R R k p i i l CR         8 7 4 3
* ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ         (11) 
where a ^ over each term indicates an expected value,   l k is the U.S. average % of household 
income dedicated to paying a mortgage, and w is average household wage earnings in the U.S. 
(by rural/urban county type).  Note that this expression depends on the value of Ni, or on whether 
a county is rural or urban.  Thus, all models estimated will yield separate estimates for prices in 
rural counties and urban counties.  This will allow for comparisons between prices in rural and 
urban areas. 
In equation (11), the expression of   is a linear combination of normal random 
variables.
* ˆ s p
*
9  Thus,   is also a normal random variable.  The expected value of   can be found 
easily by substituting the expected values of the  coefficients from the regression output into 
equation (4 and 5).   What about the variance of  ?  It would be quite useful to have some idea 
of about the reliability of the estimate of  .  A t-statistic for   can be computed if the standard 
deviation of   is known.  In many hedonic models obtaining this estimate is simple because the 
implicit price is simply equal to the regression coefficient obtained from a model and the standard 
t-statistic reported with the regression output provides an indication of the significance of price.  In 
this case, however, since the price equation is a linear combination of several regression 
coefficients, the variance of the estimated price is correctly expressed as follows 
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
                                                 
9 The regression coefficients in an OLS regression model are normal random variables.  The 
expected value and standard deviation for each coefficient are reported in the model output. 
  30   
        

     
j i
j i l l s X X Cov w R V w V k w R V k w V p V , 2 ˆ 8 7 4 3
*      (12) 
where the (Xi,Xj) pairs are all the possible combinations of the first four terms in the equation.  
Since the  coefficients used in equation (11) come from two separate regression models these 
covariance terms are not known for many of the (Xi,Xj) pairs.
10  In addition, since amenities affect 
both wages and property values it is likely incorrect to assume that that estimates of the  
coefficients are independent (which would mean the covariance terms equal zero).  Thus, it is not 
possible to directly compute the standard deviation of  needed to compute a t-statistic to test 
the significance of  .  In the current literature using the Rosen-Roback method to estimate, 
either no mention of the significance of the price estimates is given or authors make an implicit 
assumption of the independence of the  estimates in their calculation of the t-statistics (e.g., 
Gyourko and Tracy 1991; Blomquist et al 1988). 
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
One solution to this problem is to use a simulation program to compute a discrete mean 
and standard deviation for  , which can then be used to calculate a t-statistic to test the 
significance of the estimated price.  For each of the models in this analysis, the expected value 
and the standard deviation of the implicit prices are computed in @RISK using a Monte Carlo 
simulation.  For each amenity in the model, the values of 
* ˆ s p
3, 4,  7,  and 8 are entered into 
@RISK as normal random variables, where the mean and standard deviation for each normal 
random variable are obtained from the OLS models.  Then  is computed 10,000 times, each 
time using different values for 
* ˆ s p
3,  4,  7,  and 8 that are randomly determined according from 
their normal distributions.  The mean and standard deviation of these 10,000 observations of 
are the discrete mean (expected value) and discrete standard deviation of  , respectively.  
Dividing the discrete mean by the discrete standard deviation, gives a discrete t-statistic  .
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
* ˆ s p
11  
While these discrete values are not the true values for the mean, standard deviation, and t-
statistic for the significance of  , the very large number of iterations used in the simulation 
ensures that they are accurate enough to provide a useful test of the reliability of the estimate of 
. 
* ˆ s p
 
                                                 
10 Implicit in this statement is the assumption that the errors across the wage and property 
equations are independent. 
11 This t-statistic is the familiar test of the null hypothesis that ps
*=0, and is equal to the expected 
value divided by the standard deviation.  If the absolute value of the t-statistic is greater than or 
equal to 1.645, the null hypothesis is rejected and ps
* is statistically different from zero at the 90% 
level of significance. 
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